We develop a stochastic model of random search on the job, with ex-ante heterogeneous workers and firms and aggregate productivity shocks in which firms make state contingent offers and counter offers to workers. The model delivers rich dynamics in which the distributions of unemployed workers, posted vacancies, and worker-firm matches evolve stochastically over time. We prove that the surplus function, which defines the value of a match and fully characterizes the mobility decision of workers, does not depend on the distributions of unemployed workers, posted vacancies or worker-firm matches. This result means that solving the model with aggregate productivity shocks becomes no more difficult than solving the stationary version. We calibrate the model to aggregate US labor market data, and discipline the estimates of worker and firm heterogeneity by matching unemployment duration dependence and cross-sectional dispersion in value added across matches. The model matches the degree of volatility in labor productivity, unemployment, vacancies, and transitions observed in 1951-2007 US data. The model also does a good job predicting the these relationships for the 2008-12 recessionary period. We use the model to measure the degree to which mismatch between the requirements of vacant jobs and the abilities of unemployed workers changed during the 2008-12 recession. * We thank seminar participants at Yale, U Penn, Carlos III Madrid, Bocconi, Essex, IFS, the Bank of England and the 2012 CAP conference in Sandbjerg, Denmark for very helpful comments and discussions.
Introduction
The 2008-12 recession in the US is characterized by several striking features that make it appear quite different from previous recessions. While output fell and unemployment rose labor productivity remained stable. While unemployment rose, the number of long term unemployed increased well beyond what has been seen since 1951. Finally, the level of unemployment remained high, even in the face of an increase in vacancies, suggesting that the pool of unemployed workers may not be well suited to fill these vacancies. These observations suggest that there may be strong interactions between the heterogeneity in worker skills and in job requirements that depend on the level of aggregate activity. To understand how these interactions may work requires a model of the labor market which incorporates both worker and firm level heterogeneity and aggregate uncertainty. Existing models of equilibrium (random) search, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) , rely on the stationary of the equilibrium for tractability, which means the equilibrium distributions can effectively be treated as parameters rather than state variables.
In this paper, we develop a stochastic model of random search on the job, with ex-ante heterogeneous workers and firms and aggregate productivity shocks in which firms make state contingent offers and counter offers to workers. The model extends the work of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) , incorporating aggregate productivity shocks and non-stationary distributions of unemployed workers and worker-firm matches. We obtain tractability by working with the function that defines the joint surplus of a worker-firm match, rather than the individual values functions of the worker and firm separately. The model delivers rich dynamics in which the distributions of unemployed workers, posted vacancies, and worker-firm matches evolve stochastically over time. We prove that the (unique) surplus function, which defines the value of a match and fully characterizes the mobility decision of workers, does not depend on the distributions of unemployed workers, posted vacancies or worker-firm matches. The implication is that the fixed point defining the surplus can be solved for independently from the current distributions of unemployed workers and worker-firm matches. The evolution of these distributions in the stochastic economy can then be solved for exactly, given the initial conditions. This paper is related to the literature on search models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks; sorting in the labor market; unemployment volatility; and mismatch: Menzio and Shi (2010a) , Menzio and Shi (2010b) , Menzio and Shi (2011) , Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (Forthcoming) , Coles and Mortensen (2012) , Kaas and Kircher (2011), Schaal (2012) , Carrillo-Tudela and Visshers (2012) , Robin (2011) , Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2013) , Shimer and Smith (2000) , Shimer (2005) , Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) , Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2012) ... [incomplete] .
The Model

Agents and Technology
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived workers indexed by type x ∈ [x, x]. The measure of worker types in the population is exogenous and denoted by (x), with (x) dx = 1. There is a continuum of firms indexed by type y ∈ [y, y]. The size of firms and the distribution of jobs in the economy is endogenous, and determined by firms' choice of recruiting activity. Similarly, the aggregate state of the economy is indexed by z t ∈ [z, z]. At the beginning of each period the aggregate state changes from z to z according to the Markov transition probability π(z, z ), π(z, z ) ≥ 0, π(z, z ) dz = 1.
Workers seek to maximize the expected sum of lifetime income, discounted at rate r. Unemployed workers have access to a home production technology b(x, z), which depends on a worker's own type and the current aggregate productivity of the economy. When matched with a firm the worker receives a wage that is, in general, type-, state-, and history dependent. The contribution of z is common to all production in the current period, the contribution of y is common to all matches in the same firm, while match specific productivity is governed by the interaction of a worker's type x and the firm type y. We will assume throughout that market output is increasing in the aggregate shock p z > 0. We will allow for the possibility that positive value added may require a threshold level of inputs. For example, a given production function indexed by y may require workers of sufficient skill before value added is positive. Since the production technology is defined at the level of the match, there is no complementarity between workers within a firm. We allow for complementarities between worker and firm types p xy ≥ 0; any correlations in output between workers at the same firms are attributed to the common firm component. When producing firms pay each worker a wage that will depend on the firm's type, the worker's type, and, in general, the history of aggregate shocks and the history of the worker's outside options. Each period firms engage in recruiting new workers by choosing vacancies v(y), paying convex (flow) recruiting cost c[v(y)]. In addition to recruiting new workers, firms may make new wage offers to existing workers in an attempt to retain those with outside offers, or in response to the aggregate shock.
Contractual Environment
Let W t (w, x, y) denote the present value to a worker of a wage w for a worker of type x employed by a firm of type y, where the t subscript indicates that this value function depends on all the time varying states, including the aggregate productivity z t , the distribution of unemployed workers u t (x), and the distribution of matches h t (x, y). 1 Similarly, let Π t (w, x, y) denote the expected profit to a firm. Let B t (x) denote the value of unemployment. This is the value of the outside option for the worker if the negotiation does not succeed. On the employer side, we assume that the value of a vacancy is zero as firms can create jobs at no cost. Advertising a job is the real cost, which has to be paid per period.
Transferable utility. Define the surplus of a match as the sum of the surplus to the worker plus the surplus to the firm of being matched rather than apart:
Under the assumption of transferable utility, the wage (transfer) should not affect the size of the surplus, i.e. S t (w, x, y) ≡ S t (x, y). We shall start by assuming that the value of a match (x, y) at time t is some function S t (x, y) + B t (x), then we verify that the values W t (w, x, y) and Π t (w, x, y) calculated under this assumption are indeed consistent with the property that W t (w, x, y) + Π t (w, x, y) does not depend on w and equals the assumed match value.
workers. We adopt the sequential auction framework of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and assume that employers offer unemployed workers their reservation wage, and that on-the-job search triggers Bertrand competition between firms for workers. Bertrand competition grants the worker a value that is equal to the second highest bid.
Unemployed workers are thus hired at a wage w = φ 0,t (x, y) which solves
and when an employed worker of type x, currently employed at a firm of type y meets a firm of type y such that S t (x, y ) > S t (x, y), the worker ends up at the higher surplus match and is paid a wage w = φ 1,t (x, y , y) which solves
The key implication of Bertrand in the current environment is that the surplus only depends on time through the current aggregate state z t , and not on the distributions of vacancies, unemployed workers or current matches, as we shall show below.
Lastly, if the poacher y is such that S t (x, y ) < W t (w, x, y) − B t (x), where w is the current wage, then no quit threat can force the incumbent employer to renegotiate, and if W t (w, x, y) − B t (x) ≤ S t (x, y ) ≤ S t (x, y) then the wage contract is renegotiated to w = φ 1,t (x, y, y ). Note that the maximum wage that a firm of type y can pay to a worker of ability x is φ 1,t (x, y, y).
Wage renegotiation after a productivity shock. Let w be the wage inherited from period t − 1. In period t, contract continuation requires that the wage be renegotiated to a new value w , if necessary, to meet the the constraints:
We assume that w = φ 2,t (w, x, y) with
• φ 2,t (w, x, y) = φ 0,t (x, y) (the firm takes all the surplus) if W t (w, x, y) ≤ B t (x);
• φ 2,t (w, x, y) = φ 1,t (x, y, y) (the worker takes all the surplus) if W t (w, x, y) − B t (x) ≥ S t (x, y);
• φ 2,t (w, x, y) = w (status quo) otherwise, i.e. 0 ≤ W t (w , x, y) − B t (x) ≤ S t (x, y).
Since production is match specific, the profit maximizing decision of a firm can be taken match by match; terminate any matches which produce negative surplus; compete on wages to retain workers in positive surplus matches who have outside offers; and renegotiate wages in matches where the aggregate shock pushes the current wage outside the constraints imposed by worker and firm rationality.
Labor Market Flows
Endogenous and Exogenous Job Separations
At the beginning of period t, a measure u t (x) of unemployed workers of type x and a measure h t (x, y) of workers of type x employed at firms of type y are inherited from period t − 1. Then, the aggregate state changes from z t−1 = z to z t = z .
All jobs such that S t (x, y) < 0 are immediately destroyed, and a fraction δ of the viable ones, with S t (x, y) ≥ 0, are also destroyed. Hence the stock of unemployed workers of type x immediately after the realization of z t (at time t+) is
The stock of matches of type (x, y) is
Meeting Technology
In the new aggregate state of period t a measure u t+ (x) of workers of type x are unemployed and a measure h t+ (x, y) are employed at firms of type y. Together they produce effective search effort
where s 0 and s 1 are the relative search efforts of unemployed and employed workers.
Firms observe the new aggregate state and decide to post a distribution v t (y) of vacancies with aggregator
The total measure of meeting at time t is given by
where M (L t , V t ) is strictly increasing and concave in worker search L t and vacancy creation V t , and displays constant returns to scale in L t and V t .
Define λ 0,t as the probability an unemployed searcher contacts a vacancy and λ 1,t as the probability an employed searcher contacts a vacancy in period t. Let also q t define the probability per unit of recruiting effort v t (y) a firm contacts any searching worker. We connect these meeting rates to the meeting function as
Note that, for linearly homogeneous aggregators f and g, the accounting equality holds:
New Jobs and Matching Unemployed workers of type x meet vacancies of type y, and take the job in proportion
as each one of the u t+ (x) unemployed workers meet a vacancy with probability λ 0,t , this vacancy is of type y with probability qtvt(y)
Mt , and the match is formed if S t (x, y) ≥ 0. Similarly, employees of type x currently in a job of type y meet vacancies of type y , and move in proportion
Note that these proportions do not change if one takes the point of view of the firms. Thus, vacancies of type y meet unemployed workers of type x, and match in proportion
They meet employees in firms y , and match in proportion
Laws of Motion
The law of motion for unemployment is therefore
and for employment
subtracting those lost to more productive poachers, and adding the (x, y)-jobs created by poaching from less productive firms and hiring from unemployment.
The Value of Unemployment
Consider a worker of type x who is unemployed for the whole period t. During that period she earns b t (x) and she anticipates that, at the beginning of period t + 1, after revelation of the new aggregate state, she will meet a vacancy of type y with probability λ 0,t+1
. B t (x), the value to this unemployed worker, is then
where E t is the expectations operator taken with respect to the information set at time t, which includes z t , v t (y), u t (x), and h t (x, y).
Making use of the assumption that firms offer unemployed workers their reservation wages, equation (1), whether she takes the job or not, the continuation value is the value of unemploy-
The Surplus
We are now in a position to state and prove our main result.
Proposition 1. The surplus from an (x, y) match at time t depends on time only through the current aggregate productivity shock z and does not depend on the distributions of vacancies, unemployed workers or worker-firm matches. Specifically, S t (x, y) ≡ S(x, y, z) such that
where s(x, y, z) = p(x, y, z) − b(x, z) and we denote x + = max{x, 0}.
The proof is in Appendix (A).
The distribution of vacancies, unemployed workers and worker-firm matches affect the values of the worker and the firm, since they are directly relevant when calculating both the probability a worker will receive an outside offer next period and the distribution of types of vacancies she will contact next period. However, outside offers do not change the amount of surplus in the match, only how it is shared between the worker and the firm. When a firm counters an out side offer to retain the worker this is done by transferring more of the match surplus to the worker, but has no impact of the surplus in the match. Similarly, when a worker is poached by another firm, Bertrand competition ensures that the value to the worker of moving to the new match is exactly the total surplus at the previous match. The previous firm is then left with the value of a vacancy, which is equal to zero in equilibrium due to competition in vacancy creation.
Vacancy Creation
Each period firms attempt to recruit new workers, paying convex costs c[v t (y)], with c(0) ≥ 0, c > 0, c (0) = 0, and c > 0. It is optimal to post vacancies v t (y) up to the point where the marginal vacancy makes zero expected profit:
where J t (y) is the expected value of a new match
The first order condition for this problem is
With a Cobb-Douglas matching function
where θ t ≡ V t /L t , and recruiting cost function of the form
we have
Aggregating over v t (y) and substituting for q t gives equilibrium market tightness
where we define
Definition and Computation of the Stochastic Search Equilibrium
Following directly from the results presented above, we can solve for the stochastic equilibrium in this environment in two stages.
1. For given home production and value added technologies b(x, z) and p(x, y, z); discount rate r; exogenous job destruction rate δ; and stochastic process for the aggregate state π(z, z ) the surplus function S(x, y, z) is sufficient to determine all decisions regarding worker mobility and is defined by the unique solution to the function equation (8).
For a given vacancy cost function c[v(y)]
, and meeting technology M (L, V ); and for any given initial distributions of unemployed workers u 0 (x) and workers matched to jobs h 0 (x, y), a sequence of aggregate productivity shocks {z t } T t=0 , implies a unique sequence of distributions of vacancies, unemployed workers, and worker-firm matches
The sequence of distributions can be found by using the surplus function S(x, y, z) and iterating on equations (3), (4), (10), (11), (5), and (6) starting from time 0 information
Data
Wherever possible we use publicly available aggregate data. The unemployment data are from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and cover the period 1951q1 to 2012q4. We use the BLS series of seasonally adjusted monthly employment and unemployment levels for all persons aged 16 and over. In addition to the number of unemployed, we also use the number of unemployed with unemployment durations of more than 5, 15 and 27 weeks. We divide the unemployment levels each month by the sum of unemployment and employment to obtain rates. This gives us monthly series for U m , U From these series we construct monthly transition rates between unemployment and employment and between unemployment and employment as follows:
The BLS does provide a series for job-to-job transitions. We construct this series using the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1994q1 to 2012q4. This series is constructed following Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) . To obtain a consistent series we project the HWI series onto the JOLTS series for the overlapping months in the years. We then obtain a combined series using predicted HWI based on the JOLTS to put them into the same scale. The level is immaterial as we are only interested in the volatility of this series.
Output data is provided on a quarterly frequency. We use the BLS quarterly series 1951q1-2012q4 of seasonally adjusted real value added in the non-farm business sector to construct aggregate output. We also construct a measure of productivity dispersions across jobs using the Bureau and Economic Analysis (BEA) series for value added per job by industry 1951q1-2012q4.
Our measure of productivity dispersion is the standard deviation of the log of value added per job across 19 industries. 2
Since the value added series are only provided at the quarterly frequency, we aggregate all series up this frequency by taking the quarterly average for the monthly series. We remove a quadratic trend from the log-transformed quarterly series, estimated on the period 1951q1 to 
Parametric Specification and Model Fit
Parametrization
We choose the following parametrization of the model. The distribution of workers is assumed to be Beta with parameters β 1 and β 2 to be estimated. We approximate the continuous heterogeneity by a grid of linearly spaced points
We specify the set of potential job
Similarly, we specify a grid of linearly spaced points a 1 , a 2 , ..., a N z on [ε, 1 − ε] ⊂ (0, 1), used to define the aggregate productivity shocks z i . The aggregate productivity shock is given by z i = F −1 (a i ), and the transition probability π(z i , z j ) ∝ C(a i , a j ), where C is a copula density, and we normalize j π(a i , a j ) = 1. Specifically, we set N x = 51, N y = 51, N z = 151, F is lognormal with parameters zero and σ, and C is a Gaussian copula density with parameter governing dependence ρ. We set the length of a period in the model to be one week.
The discount rate is set to five percent annually.
For the meeting function and posting costs we assume a Cobb-Douglas meeting function
with α > 0 and ω ∈ [0, 1]. We assume the effective amount of worker search effort is given by a 3 Results based on moments calculated using an HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 are presented in Appendix B.1.
4 Restricting the range of x and y to the unit interval is simply a normalization of the production function. The distributional assumption on x has no affect on the value of the surplus function S(x, y, z), although it will directly impinge on the distribution of worker-firm marches ht(x, y) and posted vacancies vt(y).
weighted average of unemployed and employed worker search
with s 0 > 0 and s 1 > 0. The flow cost of posting a vacancies is modeled as a power function and is assumed to be independent of the type of the firm
with c 0 > 0 and c 1 > 0. The expression for vacancy creation v t (y) implied by these forms is given in equation 11.
We approximate value added at the match level by a second order Taylor series in worker and firm type, which is proportional to the aggregate shock z
Recall that we are modeling value added (revenue minus non-labour costs), not total output.
We want to allow the possibility that higher y firms may operate with more costly non-labor inputs. In this case only workers with skill above a particular threshold would produce enough to cover the non-labor costs and hence deliver positive profit to the firm. For example, suppose p 1 = p 2 = p 3 = p 4 = 0, p 5 = −1 and p 6 = 1, then only matches in which x > y will product positive value added. Alternatively, suppose p 1 = 1, p 2 = p 3 = 0, p 4 = p 5 = −1, and p 6 = 2, then value added is maximized when x = y and decreases as x and y differ (x is not well matched to y). We model home production as comprising a fixed component plus a component that depends on the worker type and the aggregate state
Moments
We estimate the model by the method of simulated moments. The data moments we target in estimation, along with their model simulated values, are listed in Table 1 . We target the mean and standard deviation of the unemployment rate, the number unemployed more than 5, 15, and 27 weeks, unemployment-to-employment transitions, employment-to-unemployment transitions, job-to-job transitions, the cross-sectional standard deviation of value added per match (measured in the data as valued added by sector from the BEA); the standard deviation of vacancies; the standard deviation of the vacancy to unemployment ratio; the standard deviation and autocorrelation of value added; the correlation between vacancies and unemployment; the correlation between unemployment-to-employment and job-to-job transitions; and the correlations between value added and unemployment, vacancies, unemployment-to-employment transitions, employment-to-unemployment transitions, and the cross-sectional standard deviation of value added per per match.
We solve and simulate data from the model at a weekly frequency. We then aggregate the weekly data exactly to obtain data series at the quarterly frequency. All moments are calculated on the quarterly data (actual and simulated). We aggregate the model simulated data exactly as it comes from the BLS and BEA.
Using the subscript t to denote weekly time-series simulated from the model, we first construct the following weekly series: the weekly series of aggregate value added
and cross-sectional standard deviation of value added per job across firms
, where p t (y) = p(x, y, z t )h t (x, y) dx, with E t (y) = h t (x, y) dx , and E t = h t (x, y) dx dy.
We calculate the weekly series of the number of unemployed workers with durations of 5, 15, and 27 weeks or more as
where U s t is the number of unemployed workers at period t who have been unemployed for s periods (weeks) or more. We then construct monthly transition rates exactly as we did from the BLS data
where the subscript month corresponds to the same week which would be samples by the BLS. 5
The monthly job-to-job transition rate can be constructed in a similar manner: 6
where the number of employed workers is given by
and we calculate the number of workers who are still employed at the same job as they were s weeks earlier
The resulting series are aggregated exactly as the data to obtain the corresponding moments.
We fit the model to moments of the US data from 1950q1 to 2007q4, and reserve the great recession years 2008q1 to 2012q4 for out of sample analysis. Given the specification above, we have 21 parameters to determine: α, ω, s 0 ,
The BLS survey is done each month in the week containing the 12 of the month. For example, in the first year of the simulation we sample the monthly data from simulation weeks {2, 7, 11, 15, 19, 24, 28, 33, 37, 42, 46, 50}. 6 We use the term job-to-job transition, but we are actually working with one minus the fraction of workers who stay at the same job, which will differ from the job-to-job transition rate due to the competing risk of moving to unemployment. We calculating the same statistic from the CPS and the simulated data.
p 5 , p 6 , and r. We fix the discount rate, r, to 5 percent annually. We normalize s 0 to 1 and fix ω at 0.5. 7 While none of the parameters has a one-to-one relationship to a moment, we can provide a heuristic description of identification as follows. the main variation can be described as follows: The mobility parameters α, s 1 and δ are identified by the average rates at which workers transit between unemployment and employment, between jobs, and from employment to unemployment. The parameters of the latent productivity shock, σ and ρ, are identified by the standard deviation and auto-correlation of output (corrected for selection via the model).
The flow cost of posting new vacancies, c 0 and c 1 , governs the response of vacancies to changes in profitably and is identified by the standard deviation of vacancies and the correlation of vacancies with output. The last set of parameters β i , b j , and p k govern the distribution of worker types in teh population, home production, and value added. The distribution of worker types is identified by the pattern in the number of workers unemployed 5, 15 and 27 or more weeks (homogeneous workers would imply this distribution is exponential). The contribution of firm type to value added is identified by the cross-sectional variation in value added per job. Finally, we can separate value added from home production since the decision to match or separate is tied to p t − b t , but only p t determines value added.
Estimation Results
To obtain simulated time-series we begin with a distribution of workers across employment states and jobs implied by the economy in the absence of any aggregate shock. We then simulate the economy for 700 years at the weekly frequency, discard the first 100 years to reduce the impact of initial conditions, aggregate to quarterly data (described above) and calculate the simulated moments (Table 4) . The GMM objective function is non-smooth and displays many local minimum. We use a variant on simulated annealing and many starting values to address these issues.
The empirical and simulated moments are presented in Table 1 (columns labeled Data and I), and the model parameters that provide the best fit are given in Table 2 . Overall the model fits the moments very well, the exceptions being that the model generates only 88 percent of the cross-sectional dispersion in value added per job, and the correlations of output with Note: The data used to construct the moments is 1951q1-2007q4. Model (I) baseline model; (II) home production is independent of worker type and aggregate state b(x, z) = b; (III) no worker or firm heterogeneity; (IV) only worker heterogeneity; (V) has no production complementarities: p xy = 0; (VI) has production of the form p(x, y, z) = xyz.
unemployment, vacancies and the job finding rate are somewhat stronger than in the data.
In the columns labelled II-VI we show the fit of several restricted versions of the model. In each case we re-estimate the model to fid the best fit to the moments. Model II is identical to our base model with the exception that we assume all workers have identical home production and that home production is unrelated to the aggregate shock. This model fits all the moments as well as model I, with the exception of the cross-sectional productivity dispersion and the volatility of vacancy creation, where model II produces half the volatility of model I. By allowing home production to vary with worker type and the aggregate state the model can create more dispersion in value-added per job without altering the surplus which governs matching, since it is possible to hold the surplus constant and change market and home production in the same way. Models III and IV examine the importance of worker and firm heterogeneity in matching the moments. Model III has no worker or firm heterogeneity, and by definition does not produce dispersion in value added across jobs. The model without heterogeneity is also unable to match the empirical pattern of unemployment by durations of 5, 15 and 27 plus weeks. Model IV has worker heterogeneity only, but still produces very little dispersion in value added per job (one tenth of model I) and implies a counterfactual positive correlation between this dispersion and aggregate value added. Model V assumes that market production is additive in worker and firm type, and again produce a low degree of dispersion in value added per job. Finally, model VI assumes that value added is of the form p(x, y, z) = xyz. In this case all workers match will all firms and the model has difficultly matching the moments related to unemployment by duration, and the dispersions of value added per job. Models IV, V, and VI all also produce a very low correlation between unemployment and vacancies (a Beveridge curve that is too flat).
Model fit 1951-2007 and prediction for 2008-2012
The model was estimated to fit the moments calculated on the 1951-2007 data. In Figure 1 we plot the US time-series data for 1951-2012, along with the model predicted series for output, unemployment, the employment to unemployment transition rate, unemployment to employment transition rate, vacancies, and unemployment of 27 weeks or longer. Looking at the fit to the series of employment to unemployment transitions we note several inflexibilities of the model on the job destruction front. First, white the model predicted series rises and falls in line with the data, the model produces spikes in job destruction rather than sustained increases. In the model, a negative aggregate will cause a jump in the number of jubs destroyed doue to negative surplus, however, unless the shock continues downward this is a one period effect and the destruction rate will soon return to the level of the exogenous rate δ. Second, the exogenous destruction rate δ puts a lower bound on the employment to unemployment flows, which make the model unable to reproduce the very low separation rates during the late 1960s, which explains the inability to match the very low unemployment during this period.
The model does better with matching the job finding rate, producing a much smoother series for transition from unemployment to employment than the other direction. The model somewhat over predicts the drop in the job finding rate. The model is able to attain good fit to the unemployment rate during the last recession but this arises from an under prediction of the job losing rate (after the initial spike) and an over prediction of the decline in the job finding rate. The implication of this excess decline in the job finding rate shows up when we parameter of 1,600 in the web appendix. Using the HP filter has the advantage of easier comparability with existing studies, but has the undesirable implication that it produces a series in which unemployment (output) is below (above) trend by 20011. look at the predicted series for longterm unemployed (27 or more weeks). A notable feature of the 2008-12 recession is the large increase in fraction of workers who were unemployed for 27 weeks or more. In out data series this share topped out at 3.5 percent of workers during this period, close to twice the historic high over the 1951-2007 period. The increase in the number of longterm unemployed predicted by the model is nearly twice as large as the actual spike. This is the result of the model over predicting the fall in the unemployment to employment transition rate, and the inability to produce the sustained increase in the job destruction rate observed in the data.
Finally, the predicted fit of the model to the data for vacancies is mixed. The predicted series fits very well for the period up to somewhere around the mid 2000s, then begins to break down. It is worth noting that the fit begins to deteriorate exactly at the time the vacancy series switches from the help wanted index to the JOLTS, which may be at least part of the explanation.
A puzzling feature of the vacancy series is that after an initial drop in 2008, vacancies rise continuously though 2012, a feature that is clearly at odds with the model prediction of continued low level of vacancies.
One natural motivations for introducing worker and firm heterogeneity into a model is that the composition of workers and active jobs at different points of the cycle will have implications for measured labor productivity. Indeed, in such a model labor productivity could actually increase in a downturn as the least productive (low surplus) matches are terminated and only the most productive remain. In Figure 2 we plot the labor productivity (value added per job) against aggregate output and against the unemployment rate, for both the US time-series and our model predicted data. For most the the period there is a strong negative relationship between labor productivity and the unemployment rate. However, during the 2007-12 recession as unemployment became very high, labor productivity remained flat (or possibly rose). The model also produces this pattern. When unemployment is low or moderate (between 4 and 8 percent) there is a strong negative relationship between unemployment and labor productivity.
However, when unemployment rises above 8 percent labor productivity flattens out (and dips up slightly), as only the worst matches separate. The same pattern is apparent when looking at the relationship between labor productivity and output. Again, at very low levels of aggregate output labor productivity flattens out (and turns mildly upward). One notable difference between the patterns in the data and those produced by the model is that the level of labor productivity during the 2007-12 period is notably higher than the model predicts. There is also substantially more variation in the data than the model predicts, suggesting there may be some medium term fluctuations in parameters we are treating as constant in the model.
Interpretation
The interaction of heterogeneity and aggregate shocks.
The mechanism for how the model combines two sided heterogeneity and aggregate shocks to produce the moments in Table 1 can be readily understood by examining the shape of the estimated surplus function. In Figure 3(a) we plot the set of feasible matches for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of the aggregate shock. The shaded area bounded by the solid line represents all matches which are feasible when the aggregate shock is high (at the 90th percentile). The two solid lines inside the shaded area represent the boundaries of the feasible set of matches when the aggregate shock is at the 50th and 10th percentiles. If the aggregate state moved from the 90th to the 10th percentile, all matches outside the new bounds would immediately separate. Additionally, the set of jobs that are feasible for unemployed workers shrinks, lowering the job finding rate, especially so for low type workers. When the aggregate state improves, the set of feasible matches expands substantially for the lowest worker types and they flow from unemployment to employment at an increased rate.
The doted line in panel (a) represents the ideal firm type for each worker type and is calculated as y(x) = arg max y S(x, y, z). Unemployed workers initially accept any job in the feasible set (conditional on the aggregate state), and through the process of on-the-job search gradually move toward the dotted line. This process has two interesting implications for identifying which workers are most affected by aggregate fluctuations. First, the set of feasible matches for worker types below the median fluctuates substantially with the aggregate state relative to workers above the median; the employment opportunities of low skilled workers is much more cyclically sensitive than the high skilled. Second, as employed workers receive offers from other firms they will move toward their preferred firm, which will be far from the boundary of the feasible matching set, and hence protected from the effect of aggregate shocks; workers with low employment tenure are more cyclically sensitive than experienced workers who have enjoyed a sustained period of employment. Note that the model requires both worker and firm heterogeneity to produce both of these implications. In panel (b) we plot the estimated distribution of worker types in the population along with the unconditional distribution of types among the unemployed. The low skilled are clearly over represented among the unemployed.
4.4.2
The value of non-market time, sorting, and firms' share of the surplus
In Table 3 we present, for each of the six specifications, statistics summarizing the estimated value of home production, the degree of sorting in the economy, and the share of the match surplus that goes to the firms' in new matches. We measure the value of home production as the ratio of what the worker can produce at home relative to the maximum she can produce when matched to a firm, evaluated at the mean aggregate state z. For our best fitting model, the mean of this measure is 0.956, with a range of 0.904 to 0.980. The mean is almost identical to both the value we obtain when we assume no heterogeneity and the value used by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . Indeed, most of our specifications imply that the value of home production is quite close to the value of market production on average. However, when we fix the value of home production to be independent of worker type and the aggregate shock (model II) our mean estimate drops to 0.835, with a minimum of 0.178 and maximum of 0.959. All worker types in this specification have relative home production below 0.96 of market production. Figure 3: Feasible matches, aggregate shocks, optimal matches, and the distribution of unemployed worker types Notes: The solid lines in panel (a) mark the boundaries for the set of feasible matches when the aggregate shock is at the 90th, 50th and 10th percentile (moving from outer to inner lines). The dotted line plots the optimal firm type for each worker type y(x) = arg max S(x, y, z). In panel (b) we plot the estimated distribution of worker types in the population and the unconditional distribution of worker types among the unemployed. Notes: b(x, z)/p(x, y(x), z) is home production relative the maximum market production at the mean aggregate shock z. The correlation between worker and firm type, corr(x, y), is measured using the distribution implied when the aggregate shock remains at its mean for a long time. The firm share of surplus at matching is calculated as the average share of the match surplus going to the firm among newly created matches (formed with either unemployed or employed workers). As an initial indication of the degree of sorting implied by the various models we present the correlation between worker and firm type among productive matches. The distribution of matches used is the long run distribution implied by holding the aggregate shock at the mean z. The two specifications that provide the best fit to the moments (I and II) both imply a strong positive correlation, 0.74 and 0.71. Sorting is not defined in the two models without two sided heterogeneity. We obtain negative sorting from teh model without complementarity in production, and zero sorting in the model with xyz production where all matches are feasible and all workers always move from lower to higher type firms.
In Figure 4 we plot the model predicted relationship between the degree of sorting among productive matches (measured as correlation) and output and unemployment. 9 The model produces a negative relationship between sorting and aggregate output, as poorly matched workers and firms are only sustainable when the aggregate shock is high. The relationship with unemployment is positive, although we can observe the entire range of correlations when the unemployment rate is low. This patterns arising from the matching set being large when the aggregate state is high, many newly hired workers are poorly matched initially, but quickly move to more appropriate jobs and increase he overall level of sorting in the economy as the high aggregate shock persists.
Our assumption on wage contracts implies that workers are always offered their reservation wage. The implication is that when a firm hires a worker out of unemployment it receives the entire match surplus. However, when it hires a worker who is already employed it only receives the share of the surplus in excess of what is necessary to poach the worker. Since there are many more employed than unemployed workers, firms generally receive a share well below one of newly formed matches. In our best fitting specifications this share is 0.27. The aggregate behavior of the model is that on average firms' bargaining position grants them just under 30 percent of the match surplus, although this is the result of averaging over very heterogeneous bargains with individual workers. All of our specifications imply that on average the surplus share of new matches which goes to firms is below 0.56.
Aggregate output, types of vacancies posted, and the pool of unemployed
How do the types of vacancies posted and the composition of the unemployed change with the aggregate state of the economy? In Figure 5 we plot the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the distributions of vacancy types posted and worker types in the pool of unemployed against aggregate output underlying the model simulated data in Figure 1 . The number of vacancies created at the 50th and 90th percentile increase mildly with the aggregate output, however vacancies created at the 10th percentile are very sensitive the to aggregate state. These are jobs that can be filled by any type of worker, and are also the only types of jobs that are feasible for the lowest worker types. When the aggregate state is high these are the most plentiful vacancies, but become scarce when the aggregate state is poor.
The pattern implied for who the unemployed are in quite striking. When aggregate output is higher than 95 percent of the mean, there is a clear ranking where the largest number of unemployed are at the 10 percentile, followed by those at the median with those at the 90th well below. When the economy is very bad, below 95 percent of average, the number of unemployed workers at the median skill type swells to equal those at the 10 percentile. that produces a positive surplus and then continue to search for a match that produces a higher surplus. Even with on the job search relative few workers will be employed at their surplus maximizing job. This mismatch among the employed workers generates mismatch between the distribution of vacancies desired by the unemployed and those offered by firms. Firms create vacancies not only in response to the available worker types in the pool of the unemployed, but also in response to the distribution of poorly matched workers among the employed. Equation (9) gives the expected value to a firm from a type-y match. This comprises tow parts, the first is expected profits from hiring unemployed workers and the second is the expected profit from hiring employed workers show are currently poorly matched. As employed workers move closer to their optimal jobs the return to hiring them falls, leading firms to post vacancies that are more closely targeted to the unemployed. In the limit if h t (x, y) tends to h(x, y(x)) the return to meeting an employed worker goes to zero as they are already at their most preferred match.
Measuring mismatch during the great recession
In this case firms will post vacancies directed solely toward the unemployed.
The degree to which the types of vacancies created is mismated for the distribution of unemployed workers is directly related to the degree to which employed workers are not currently at their optimal jobs. To measure how the degree of mismatch among the employed workers translates into mismatch between vacancies and unemployed workers we define the counter factual distribution of vacancies that would be optimal to post if firms were targeting only unemployed workers. This is the distribution of vacancies firms would create if all employed workers where currently optimally matched. We calculate this distribution by calculating
and plugging the result into equation (11) to obtain v 0 t (y). We then calculate a series of mismatch in vacancies by calculating the absolute value of the difference between the two distributions
In Figure ( 6) we plot our measure of mismatch against the series of simulated output and unemployment (from Figure (1) ). Two patterns emerge. First our measure of mismatch is negatively related to output and positively related to unemployment. Second, the range of values is greater when output is low and when unemployment is high. When the aggregate state is bad, the unemployment pool is populated by worker types which produce small surpluses, and as a result it is relative more profitable for firms to create jobs targeted at the distribution of employed, but poorly matched, workers. As these workers become better and better matched firms turn to targeting vacancies to the distribution of unemployed workers. [incomplete]
Efficiency
[incomplete]
In the case of quadratic vacancy costs it is easy to show a constrained social planner would choose the same distribution of vacancies as the decentralized economy delivers (although the level would differ due to the congestion externality in matching.
Extensions
We could accommodate additional non-stationarity be allowing most of the model parameters to be time varying, including the distribution of worker types ( t (x)); the matching technology (M t , L t ); and the costs of posting vacancies (c t ).
Key interventions to reduce unemployment in this environment include improving the skills of workers and lowering where possible, the costs of hiring.
Conclusions
A Derivation of the Surplus Equation
The Value of Employment Consider a worker of type x who is employed at a firm of y with a wage contract paying w for the period t. During the period she earns the wage w and expects that at the beginning of period t + 1 after realization of the new aggregate state she may become unemployed or remain employed, with the possibility of being contacted by another firm of type y , which happens with probability λ 1,t+1
. The value of this employment to the worker is
Where we partition the set of potential firms a worker may meet into those that will trigger a job change M 1,t (x, y) ≡ {y |S t (x, y ) > S t (x, y)}; those that will trigger a wage renegotiation, M 2,t (w, x, y) ≡ {y |W t (w, x, y) − B t (x) < S t (x, y ) < S t (x, y); and those that will trigger neither a job change nor a wage renegotiation, [y, y]\M 1,t+1 (x, y)∪M 2,t+1 (w, x, y). In this last instance the contract may still have to be renegotiated if the shock z t+1 moves the current wage w out of the new bargaining set [φ 0,t+1 (x, y), φ 1,t+1 (x, y, y)].
Making use of the wage determination equations (1) and (2) we can write the surplus to a worker of type x, matched with a firm of type y and currently earning a wage w as W t (w, x, y) − B t (x) = w − b(x, z) + 1 1 + r E t (1 − δ)1{S t+1 (x, y) ≥ 0} λ 1,t+1
y ∈M 1,t+1 (x,y) S t+1 (x, y) q t+1 v t+1 (y ) M t+1 dy + λ 1,t+1
y ∈M 2,t+1 (w,x,y) S t+1 (x, y ) q t+1 v t+1 (y ) M t+1 dy + 1 − λ 1,t+1
y ∈M 1,t+1 (x,y)∪M 2,t+1 (w,x,y)
where we denote x + = max{x, 0}.
The Value of a Filled Job Consider a firm of type y who is currently matched with a worker of type x, paying a wage w for the period t. Next period, the firm may be left without a worker if the match is terminated, either for endogenous or exogenous reasons, or the worker is poached by another firm. Even if the worker does not leave, the firm may need to counter an outside offer to retain the worker. The value to the firm of this match is given by Π t (w, x, y) = p(x, y, z) − w + 1 1 + r E t (1 − δ)1{S t+1 (x, y) ≥ 0} × λ 1,t+1
y ∈M 2,t+1 (w,x,y) Π t+1 (φ 1,t+1 (x, y, y ), x, y) q t+1 v t+1 (y ) M t+1 dy + 1 − λ 1,t+1
y ∈M 1,t+1 (x,y)∪M 2,t+1 (w,x,y) q t+1 v t+1 (y ) M t+1 dy × min Π t+1 (w, x, y) + , S t+1 (x, y) .
Evaluating Π t+1 in the second line at the renegotiation wage φ 1,t+1 (x, y, y ) we have Π t (w, x, y) = p(x, y, z) − w + 1 1 + r E t (1 − δ)1{S t+1 (x, y) ≥ 0} × λ 1,t+1
y ∈M 2,t+1 (w,x,y) S t+1 (x, y) − S t+1 (x, y ) q t+1 v t+1 (y ) M t+1 dy + 1 − λ 1,t+1
The Surplus Finally, we can combine the surplus to the worker and the surplus to the firm to form the total match surplus S t (x, y) = W t (w, x, y) − B t (x) + Π t (w, x, y) = p(x, y, z) − c(y, z) − b(x, z)
y ∈M 1,t+1 (x,y)
y ∈M 2,t+1 (x,y) S t+1 (x, y) q t+1 v t+1 (y ) M t+1 dy + 1 − λ 1,t+1
y ∈M 1,t+1 (x,y)∪M 2,t+1 (w,x,y) q t+1 v t+1 (y ) M t+1 dy S t+1 (x, y) , which simplifies to S t (x, y) = p(x, y, z) − b(x, z) + 1 − δ 1 + r E t max{S t+1 (x, y), 0}.
We can directly verify the guess that S t (x, y) = S(x, y, z) such that S(x, y, z) = s(x, y, z) + 1 − δ 1 + r S(x, y, z ) + π(z, z ) dz , where s(x, y, z) = p(x, y, z) − b(x, z).
B Web Appendix
B.1 HP filtered data with smoothing parameter 1600
As a point of comparison, we redo the estimation (Model I) using moments calculated from data filtered using the standard HP filter with smoothing parameter of 1600. Notes: The dashed lines is the filtered data while the solid line is the model simulated data. The simulated data is produced by choosing the latent shock process z t and the scale of output p 0 to match the time-series of output and the mean unemployment rate for 1951-2012. 
